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THE KEYES TO RECLAIMING THE RACIAL HISTORY
OF THE ROBERTS COURT
Tom I. Romero, II*
This Article advocates for a fundamental re-understanding about the way
that the history of race is understood by the current Supreme Court. Represented
by the racial rights opinions of Justice John Roberts that celebrate racial progress, the
Supreme Court has equivocated and rendered obsolete the historical experiences of
people of color in the United States. This jurisprudence has in turn reified the
notion of color-blindness, consigning racial discrimination to a distant and discredited past that has little bearing to how race and inequality is experienced today.
The racial history of the Roberts Court is centrally informed by the context
and circumstances surrounding Brown v. Board of Education. For the Court,
Brown symbolizes all that is wrong with the history of race in the United States—
legal segregation, explicit racial discord, and vicious and random acts of violence.
Though Roberts Court opinions suggest that some of those vestiges still exits, the
bulk of its jurisprudence indicate the opposite. With Brown’s basic factual premises
as its point of reference, the Court has consistently argued that the nation has made
tremendous strides away from the condition of racial bigotry, intolerance, and
inequity.
The Article accordingly argues that the Roberts Court reliance on Brown to
understand racial progress is anachronistic. Especially as the nation’s focus for racial
inequality turned national in scope, the same binaries in Brown that had long
served to explain the history of race relations in the United States (such as BlackWhite, North-South, and Urban-Rural) were giving way to massive multicultural
demographic and geographic transformations in the United States in the years and
decades after World War II. All of the familiar tropes so clear in Brown and its
progeny could no longer accurately describe the current reality of shifting and transforming patterns of race relations in the United States.
In order to reclaim the history of race from the Roberts Court, the Article
assesses a case that more accurately symbolizes the recent history and current status
*
Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Affiliate Faculty,
Department of History and Assistant Provost of Inclusive Excellence Research and Curriculum
Initiatives, University of Denver. Associate and Senior Editor for the Michigan Journal of Race
& Law, 1998-2000. I want to thank the members of the University of Denver Sturm College of
Law’s Collective on Race, Place, and Law (“RPL”) for reading an earlier draft of this Article and
providing valuable feedback and edits. I also want to give special note of gratitude to the Editorin-Chief, Aaron Walker, for nurturing this Article through production. His care for the Article
continues the tradition established by all the founders of the Michigan Journal of Race & Law for
creating a forum for excellence and collegiality in understanding the salience of race to all aspects
of law. The founders of the Journal and all who have followed have been and continue to be
pioneers. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge all of those race scholars (many
cited in these pages) whom I had the privilege to know and learn from in the mid-to-late 1990s
at the University of Michigan. Their knowledge, insights, and truly impactful scholarship will
reverberate for generations.
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of race relations today: Keyes v. School District No. 1. This was the first Supreme
Court case to confront how the binaries of cases like Brown proved of little probative value in addressing how and in what ways race and racial discrimination was
changing in the United States. Thus, understanding Keyes and the history it
reflects reveals much about how and in what ways the Roberts Court should rethink its conclusions regarding the history of race relations in the United States for
the last 60 years.
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The use and deployment of history has long been a contested and
controversial part of judicial decision making, particularly in the Supreme
Court.1 As scholars, particularly legal historians have repeatedly pointed
out, “using the past to justify normative legal conclusions readily allows
judgments that are subjective, arbitrary, and self-serving.”2 Despite such
1.
Much of this contested discourse has revolved around the Supreme Court’s attempt to
identify “original understanding,” or “original intent, or “original meaning” for the drafters of
constitutional text. See, e.g., EDWARD JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); EDWARD
A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE (2007), DENNIS J. GOLFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER
ORIGINALISM (2005), DANIEL A. FARBER AND SUSANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND
POLITICS (2002). An instructive debate between an “originalist” and a trained historian is found
in Gordon S. Wood & Scott D. Gerber, The Supreme Court and Uses of History, 39 OHIO
NORTHERN L. REV. 435 (2013).
2.
A. Purcell, Jr., Paradoxes of Court-Centered Legal History: Some Values of Historical Understanding for a Practical Legal Education, 64 J. LEGAL ED. 229, 233 (2014) (citing to the statement by
Robert Bork that “History and tradition are very capacious suitcases . . . and a judge may find a
good deal pleasing to himself packed into them, if only because he has packed the bags himself.”). Bancroft Prize winning American Historian, Gordon S. Wood, argues that “the history
that historians write is much too complicated, too unwieldy to be used. As I say, judges have
created what has been called ‘history lite,’ I think it’s an essential part of what you do, but let’s
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criticisms, history continues to play a prominent, if not pre-eminent role
in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. From its formulation over the
constitutional right to “keep and bear arms”3 to the free speech protections extended to corporations,4 an inadequate, unreliable, and often
celebratory history often plays a determinative role in the Supreme Court’s
opinions.
Nowhere has this been more evident than in the Roberts Court jurisprudence involving individuals as well as communities of color. Building
upon the Burger and Rehnquist Courts severe restriction of “judicial oversight of minority [non-White] claims as it intensified judicial oversight of
majority [White] claims,”5 the Roberts Court has crafted a history of race
relations that does three things which I will demonstrate in the first part of
this Article. First, it disparages all uses of race. Second, it equates and
equivocates the same harm of racial classification to Whites and NonWhites. And third, it claims dramatic racial progress while ignoring altogether how and in what ways the shape, form, place, and targets of racial
discrimination has fundamentally transformed in the last fifty to sixty years.
In so doing, the Supreme Court’s racial rights jurisprudence has equivocated and rendered obsolete the historical experiences of people of color
in the United States.6 I and others have recently argued elsewhere that this
not get it confused with real critical history because that can’t be used very effectively.” Wood,
supra note 1, at 443-444.
3.

See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (citing 1 DICTIONENGLISH LANGUAGE 106 (4th ed.) (reprinted 1978)) (deploying, for instance,
Timothy Cunningham’s 1771 legal dictionary to define “arms”).

ARY OF THE

4.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 353-354. (2010) (assessing
the original meaning of the first amendment as applied to corporate speech); see also Leo E Strine
& Walter, Nicholas, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History (Feb. 13, 2015), SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2564708 or http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2564708 (critiquing the Court’s use of history in the Citizens United
case).
5.

Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2013).

6.
I explore the origins of this jurisprudence in the context of Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), through Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), in Tom I. Romero, II, ¿La Raza Latina?: Multicolor
Ambivalence, Color Denial, and the Emergence of a Tri-Ethnic Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth
Century, 37 N.M. L. REV. 245, 285-293 (2007). Recent Roberts Court cases include Ricci v.
De Stefano, 129 U.S. 2658 (2009) (holding the city of New Haven violated the Title VII rights
of White firefighters when it announced a new promotion test designed to respond to previous
tests that had resulted in the promotion of virtually all White and no Black firefighters); Arizona
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (leaving intact the ability of the state of Arizona the
ability for local police to arrest anyone who they believe has committed a crime and whom they
think is in the country in an undocumented status); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013) (reversing the Fifth Circuit’s application of its standard of review of a race-conscious
component of its admissions plan); Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invalidating §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because it relied on outdated data); and Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. __ (2014) (holding that an Amendment to
Michigan’s constitution that prohibits state universities from considering race as part of its admis-
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jurisprudence has paradoxically produced an “end of history” in cases involving race7 by reifying the notion of color-blindness and thereby consigning all the vestiges of racial thinking, benign or otherwise, to a distant
and discredited past.
The racial history project of Justice Roberts8 was revealed during his
first term on the bench in a Texas redistricting case that struck down one
congressional district in the state because it diluted the voting power of
Latinos. In contesting the majority’s opinion on this particular issue, Justice Roberts decried the decision for engaging in the “sordid business” of
“divvying us up by race.”9 Although the same “sordid” history of Latino
vote suppression and a long entrenched patterns of political, social, and
economic discrimination against Latinos, as well as Blacks, was barely
mentioned by either the majority or dissenting opinions in the case,10 Justice Roberts’s striking statement established the frame by which his Court
would evaluate the history of racial progress for cases involving race.
The logic and thereby the problems of the Roberts Court’s understanding of the history of race relations were demonstrated most recently
sion process was not based on unconstitutional racial animus); see also Reva B. Siegal, From
Colorblindness to Antibalkinazation: An emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120
YALE L. REV. 1278 (2011); Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a ZeroSum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (2010).
7.
See Tom I. Romero, II, The “Tri-Ethnic” Dilemma: Race, Equality, and the Fourteenth
Amendment in the American West, 13 TEMPLE POL. & C.R. L. REV. 817, 854-855; Joel Heller,
Shelby County and the End of History, 44 U. Memph. L. Rev. 357 (2013). Joel Heller and I have
used Francis Fuyukama’s influential book, The End of History, to argue that the Supreme Court
sees the history of race as one consigned to a long-dead past. In some of the same ways that
Fukuyama celebrates the triumph of liberal democracy in the modern world over the messy
historical forces of communalism and despotism, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992), both Heller and I argue that the Supreme Court has embraced a history that celebrates racial progress, while ignoring altogether how in and in what
ways that history fails to explain substantive changes in the ways in rich racial discrimination is
practiced and experienced. Romero, The Tri-Ethnic Dilemma, supra note 7, at 854-855; Heller,
Shelby County, supra note 7, at 376-385. In another essay, Heller describes all of the ways that
“history still matters,” in at least Voting Rights litigation. Joel Heller, Subsequent History Omitted
(2014) THE CIRCUIT. Nov. 2014 Paper 64, at 380-381, available at http://scholarship.
law.berkeley.edu/clrcircuit/64.
8.
A compelling narrative of the role that race and its history has played in the Roberts
Court and a broader understanding of this as a “project” to transform constitutional jurisprudence is detailed in MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION, Part 1, chs. 1-6 (2013).
9.
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
10.
This history is documented in Nina Perales, Luis Figueroa & Criselda G. Rivas, Voting
Rights in Texas: 1982-2006, S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. (2006). Data compiled for the report
relied on the archival research of noted historians, such as David Montejano, Julie Leininger
Pycior, and Guadalupe San Miguel, Jr. Id. at 8-13, nn. 12-45. The majority opinion in Perry
does reference the “sordid history of manipulating the electoral process to perpetuate its stranglehold on political power . . .“ 548 U.S. at 449.
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in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder.11 Writing for the majority, Justice
Roberts declared aspects of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 unconstitutional because it relied on “decades-old data and eradicated practices,” reflecting only “decades-old problems” that have “no logical relation to the
present day.”12 The problem, according to Justice Roberts, was that Congress had been using statistics derived from its coverage formula from the
mid-1960s and early 1970s as a benchmark for identifying which jurisdictions would be subject to Section 5 of the VRA, a provision requiring the
submission of any proposed change in voting policies to the federal government for approval before implementation.13 The coverage formula was
unconstitutional, according to the Court, because it failed to recognize
that “things have changed dramatically” in the covered jurisdictions, most
of which were located in the South.14
In making this argument, Justice Roberts claimed that there was “no
denying that . . . our Nation has made great strides” when it came to the
issue of racial equality.15 Justice Roberts referenced particularly the elimination of “[b]latantly discriminatory” acts that included not only a “variety of [requirements and] tests ‘specifically designed to prevent’ African
Americans from voting,” but also the elimination of murder and police
beatings of civil rights activists.16 The result was a narrative that described a
21st century United States that has thrown off many, if not all of the
shackles of its racial past. As a consequence, the Justice declared that Congress needed to adapt the legislation to address “current needs” and “current conditions.”17
This Article is designed to re-frame and thereby re-claim the ways
that the Roberts Court thinks and subsequently writes about the history of
race relations in its decision making. Indeed, it takes seriously his suggestion in Shelby County that legislatures, judges, lawyers, and citizens understand better the “current conditions”18 of racial discrimination in the
United States. I argue that the Roberts Court’s telling about the history of
race in the United States deploys an outdated and myopic binary framework to understand how racial inequality has been and continues to be
enforced through both overt and covert means. To be sure, the framework
that the Roberts Courts embraces is powerfully rooted in notions of
American exceptionalism whereby the United States is a uniquely free na11.
Shelby Cnty, 133 S.Ct. at 2612.
12.
Id. at 2627, 2629.
13.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2012). The coverage formula was found in Section 4(b) of the
Act. Id. § 1973b(b).
14.
Shelby Cnty, 133 S.Ct. at 2625.
15.
Id. at 2626.
16.
Id. at 2621 (citing N.W. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202
(2009)); id. at 2624 (quoting S.C. v. Katzenback, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966)).
17.
Id. at 2619, 2627-30.
18.
Id. at 2628-30.
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tion committed to liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and
laissez-faire or market based economics.19 Racial discrimination—particularly its manifestation and conscious codification against Blacks through a
violent, brutal and oppressive system of slavery and Jim Crow—however,
has been the tragic exception to these principles.20
In order to reconcile such dissonance, the Roberts Court in its race
cases has told a story of enlightenment whereby Americans, much like the
prisoners in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, emerge triumphantly out the dark,
dank, debilitating, and “sordid” cave of racial consciousness.21 For the
Roberts Court, history serves the same rhetorical tool as it did for Plato to
describe an upward trajectory from color-consciousness to color-blindness
in the United States. Whereas the Roberts Court opinions in race cases,
especially those by the Chief himself, have referenced a distain for slavery,
Jim Crow, and racial violence, it has done so by decrying race-conscious
thinking. By arguing that all racial thinking has created shadows of racial
discord and racial hostility, the Roberts Court instead celebrated all of the
progress that has been made to lift Americans and its legal system out of its
racist past.
For the Roberts Court, the ascent out of the cave of racial consciousness is rooted squarely in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.22 Indeed, its
“history,” Justice Roberts tells us in the 2007 case, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, “will be heard.”23 The history
19.
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED
SWORD 19, 31 (1996). In 2007, Justice Roberts gave the Keynote Address for The Federalist
Society for Law and Public Policy Studies National Lawyers Convention. Displaying his historical sensibility, Justice Roberts’ remarks focused on the judicial appointments of James Madison as
the “architect of limited government and separated powers” dependent upon an “independent
judiciary”. Justice John G. Roberts, Keynote Address at the Federalist Society for Law and Public
Policy Studies’ 2007 National Lawyers Convention (Nov 16, 2007) (transcript available at http://
fora.tv/fora/fora_transcript_pdf.php?cid=1967) (Broadcast available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRISpBGsoTOU).
20.
The historian Gary Gerstle has described the tension between “civic nationalism”
–the American belief in the fundamental equality of all human beings, in every individual’s
inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and in a democratic government
that derives its legitimacy form the people’s consent[;]” and that of “racial nationalism” – that
“conceives of America in ethnoracial terms, as a people held together by common blood and
skin color and by an inherited fitness for self-government.” GARY GERSTLE: AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4 (2001). Gerstle notes both of these
contradictory ideals are inscribed in the American constitution and as a result, have powerfully
shaped the nation. Id. at 5. Unlike the ascendant ideology I proscribe to John Roberts and his
Court, however, Gerstle sees each of these ideals as a more permanent, and unexceptional part of
American culture and life. Id. at 373-374.
21.
See C.J.S. HAYWARD, PLATO’S ALLEGORY
SOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2012).
22.
23.
(701).

OF THE

CAVE REVISITED

AND

OTHER

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746
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that Brown encapsulates has, for Justice Roberts certain “undeniable”
truths.24 One is the “fact” that racial classifications, whether used to segregate students or advance diversity “promotes notions of racial inferiority,” and “lead[s] to a politics of racial hostility.”25 The second truth is
that racial consciousness “reinforce[s] the belief, held by too many for too
much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their
skin.”26 And finally, racial consciousness “endorse[s] race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.”27 Brown’s history, the
Court tells us, “should teach greater humility” about how the shroud of
any racial thinking would inevitably lead to harm.28
It is critical to point out that the “undeniable” harms associated with
race based thinking that the Court cites emerge out of Burger and Rehnquist Court jurisprudence that largely involved white plaintiffs challenging
racial classifications. In those cases, history was deployed by each court to
make the claim that racial classifications designed to harm non-Whites in
the history of the United States are no different than racial classifications
designed to benefit non-Whites.29 Both, according to the Court, effectuate a harm on the “disfavored” group. In other words, the Court was indicating that the history of racial discrimination against Blacks and other
non-Whites, though rooted in different contexts, had value only in suggesting that Whites might suffer the same harm. As Justice Roberts made
evident in his majority opinion in Parents Involved:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and
could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The
school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden
of demonstrating that we should allow this once again [against
White plaintiffs]—even for very different reasons. The way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.30
It no surprise that Brown figures prominently in Roberts Court (as
well as its Burger and Rehnquist Court predecessors) race jurisprudence
24.
Id. at 745-46.
25.
Id. at 746 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1986).
26.
Id. at 746 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (emphasis added).
27.
Id. at 746 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting)).
28.
Id. at 742 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 609-610 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
29.
See articles cited, supra note 6; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Ricci, 129 U.S. 2658 (2009); Arizona,
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Schuette,
572 U.S. __ (2014).
30.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747-48.,
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because it marked so clearly the nation’s emergence from the cave of racist
thinking. As sociologists have repeatedly demonstrated, the era surrounding Brown marked a clear divergence in American’s racial attitudes towards
African Americans; finding that beginning during this time, “fewer whites
subscribe to the views associated with Jim Crow,” and “except for members of white supremacist organizations, few whites in the United States
claim to be ‘racist.”31
Brown also represented unambiguously the harms of racial consciousness. Rooted in “Southern” racial attitudes—from the forced and violent
enslavement of Africans and African Americans, to the state-sanctioned
Jim Crow segregation of Black children and families in many urban locales,
to the massive resistance by many Whites to court ordered integration—
Brown highlighted for many the fallacies and dangers of racial thinking.32
To be sure, the racial attitudes of the South have played a decisive role in
the racial history of the Roberts Court. In another Voting Rights Act case
that would anticipate the Court’s direction in Shelby County, the Roberts
Court had similarly proclaimed that “[t]hings have changed in the
South.”33 In this case and Shelby County, the discussion surrounding Section 5 made the faulty observation that Section 5 applies only to the
South, failing to recognize that coverage extends to jurisdictions in states
such as New York, Arizona, and South Dakota.34 By making this argument, the Roberts Court also strongly suggested that outside of the South,
no explosive history of race relations or racial discrimination existed beyond racial thinking only designed to disadvantage Whites.35 Subsequent
“fidelity” of the Roberts Court to the racial history symbolized by Brown
and all of the “change” that occurred thereafter in the South signified how
much Americans had emerged from the cave of racial consciousness36 to
become post-racial in its decision making.37
31.

EDUARDO BONILLA SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 4-8 (2d ed. 2006)
(summarizing social science scholarship documenting Whites attitudes towards Blacks).
AND THE

32.
Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and
the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 92 J. OF AMER. HIST. 92, 99-114 (2004) (assessing how proponents of Brown treated the symptoms of racism by stigmatizing racial thinking and not the disease
of White Supremacy).
33.

Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009).

34.
As Heller pointed out, “[t]reating the nine Southern states covered in whole or in
part by Section 5, which stretch from the Rio Grande Valley to the Louisiana bayou to the
Appalachian Mountains and contain millions of people, as a single entity is fallacious.” Heller,
supra note 7, at 359. n. 4
35.
See discussion on the use of race in the Seattle School District and discussion of the
harms of such racial consciousness by the School Board, supra notes 26-31.
36.

Siegel, supra note 5, at 9-10; see also Guinier, supra note 32, at 114.

37.
See, e.g., Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009) (arguing that
“post-racialism in its current iteration is a twenty-first-century ideology that reflects a belief that
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Within twenty years of the Brown decision, however, judicial deployment of history predicated on its basic factual premises had become increasingly anachronistic. Indeed, the same binaries in Brown that had long
served to explain race relations such as Black-White, North-South, and
Urban-Rural were giving way to massive demographic transformations in
the United States.38 This was a nation that in the years and decades after
World War II had become multi-cultural and multi-lingual;39 where people from around the world were moving in unprecedented numbers to the
“New West” and “New South;”40 all of whom would settle to live and
work in sprawling and segregated metropolitan spaces.41 All of the familiar
tropes so clear in Brown and its progeny—southern Jim Crow segregation,
poor Black families living in burnt-out urban communities, separate and
altogether unequal treatment in housing, employment, and public accommodations42—could no longer accurately describe the post-World War II
history nor the current reality of shifting and transforming patterns of race
relations in the United States.
In order to reclaim the history of race from the Roberts Court, I
advocate for a re-centering of the Court’s racial histories around, and
greater fidelity to, a case that more accurately represents the recent history
and current status of race relations today: Keyes v. School District No. 1.43 As
due to the significant racial progress that has been made, the state need not engage in race-based
decision-making or adopt race-based remedies.”).
38.
Tom I. Romero, II, Kelo, Parents and the Spatialization of Color(blindness) in the
Berman-Brown Metropolitan Heterotopia, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 947, 960-961 (2008).
39.
See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
40.
See infra note 103. The notion of the “New West” and the “New South” as part of a
greater whole was explored by the historian Carl Abbott in “New West, New South, new Region: The Discovery of the Sunbelt” in Raymond A. Mohl ed., Searching for the Sunbelt
(1990). A defining feature of the Sunbelt has been its racial diversity beyond the Black-White
paradigm. See Chapters 5, 6, 12 and 13 in SUNBELT RISING: THE POLITICS OF PLACE, SPACE,
AND REGION (Michelle Nickerson & Darren Dochuk ed., 2011). Recent evidence of worldwide immigration to the New West and New South is found in Audrey Singer, The New Geography of Untied Immigration, BROOKINGS IMMIGRATION SERIES, July 2009, at 4-7.
41.
See infra notes 75-88, 100-24.
42.
For representative examples in the school integration context, see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968); Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Bd. of Educ. of Knoxville,
Tenn., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1(1958). The same binary logic and
tropes continue to be applied by the Supreme Court. In its most recent opinion involving the
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) in the summer of 2015, Justice Kennedy described how rapid urbanization and suburbanization, steering by real-estate agents, and racially restrictive covenants “created many predominately black inner cities surrounded by white suburbs.” Texas Dept. of Housing
and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., No. 13-1371, S. Ct., slip op.,
June 25, 2015, at 6 (emphasis added). Though the case upheld disparate impact claims under the
FHA, Kenney’s majority opinion nevertheless indicated a narrow understanding of the full metropolitan and multi-color scope of residential housing segregation described in Part II of this
article.
43.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).

424

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL. 20:415

I have argued elsewhere, Keyes addressed both directly and indirectly how
the binaries of cases like Brown proved of little probative value in addressing
how and in what ways race and related acts of discrimination were being
transformed in the United States.44 The case is important because it did
not involve a school district in state that had never had Jim Crow type
segregation.45 The factual scenario of Keyes arose in a metropolitan area
that was neither Southern nor Northern in its physical and political geography.46 For this reason, the case reflected deep and intractable tensions in
a culture that had long struggled with the promises of color-blindness in
the face of explicit and latent racism against not only Blacks, but also Latinos, American Indians, and Asian Pacific Americans.47 For these reasons,
Keyes was poised to “become the Brown case for the rest of the country
outside the South.”48 Though the case ostensibly never met this promise,
Keyes and the United States it reflects reveals much about how and in what
ways the Roberts Court should rethink its conclusions regarding the state
of race relations in the United States for the last 60 years.
Part II of this Article accordingly examines the many ways that Keyes
pointed to a new metropolitan geography of color-blind multi-color racial
segregation in the United States. As Section A surveys, a broad and diverse
array of local, state, and federal government actions reconfigured the ways
in which American’s experienced and were impacted by race. Through
housing and transportation policy, land use laws, and strategic use of local
government controls, American’s came to live in largely homogenous suburban communities, thereby evading altogether the social mix and inequalities of their sprawling metropolitan regions. This new metropolitan
geography spatially reinforced the perception among largely White suburban communities that racial problems defined by Northern and Southern
racism were a thing of the past.
44.
See generally Tom I. Romero, II, Foreword: How I Rode the Bus to Become A Professor at
the University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Reflections on Keyes’s Legacy for the Metropolitan, PostRacial, and Multi-Racial Twenty-First Century, 90 DEN. U. L. REV. 1023 (2013).
45.
See, e.g., id. at 1024.
46.
Id. at 1035-39.
47.
Id. at 1042-46. In addition to my scholarship on Keyes, further analysis and reflection
on the case in its Denver context, including reflections from those who participated in the litigation, may be found in Denver University Law Review: Forty Years Since Keyes v. School District
No. 1; Equality of Educational Opportunity and the Legal Construction of Metropolitan America, 90
Denv. U. L. Rev. 1021 (2013). See also Sharon Ruth Brown-Bailey, Journey Full Circle: A
Historical Analysis of Keyes v. School District No. 1 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Univ. of Colo. at Denver) (on file with author); Frederick D. Watson, Removing the Barricades
from the Northern Schoolhouse Door: School Desegregation in Denver (1993) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder) (on file with author). Equally valuable for
its socio-legal insights is Rachel F. Moran, Foreword—The Lessons of Keyes: How Do You Translate
“The American Dream”?, 1 LA RAZA L.J. 195 (1986), as well as the entire Volume 1, Issue 3 of 1
LA RAZA L.J. 195 (1986), which focuses on the bilingual education aspects of Keyes.
48.
BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 260 (1979).
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On the other hand, the fragmentation and isolation of metropolitan
America obscured the extent that the nation’s traditional geographical and
racial sensibilities of North and South, Urban and Suburban, and Black
and White were being fundamentally transformed. As Section B explores,
this transformation has occurred along two paths. The first has been driven
by immigration from Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and the ways that
racialized individuals from these groups emerged to claim space and place
in these very same metropolitan regions.
The second path revolves around those same suburbs that had effectively prevented integration for decades after World War II. As metropolitan areas grew, suburbs emerged as some of the most integrated areas in the
United States, but also revealed a troubling pattern of re-segregation and
incidents of racial violence along multiple color lines. In the process, immigration law and criminal law worked together to create legal and social
conditions that were remarkably similar to the Jim Crow ordinances that
perpetuated racial discrimination and unequal treatment against African
Americans after the Civil War.
The history I subsequently tell about race in the post-World War II
United States requires the Court to recognize that the nation’s racial history was not fully forged in the South, nor was it transformed for the
better upon decisions like Brown or legislation like the Voting Rights Act
of 1965. The myopic racial history of the Court suggests neither colorblindness nor the rise of post-racial idealism. Rather, race relations
throughout the United States, particularly after World War II, have been in
a state of flux and dramatic transformation. While the Roberts Court has
consistently deployed history to describe a United States dissociated from
the insidious effects of racial change and transformation, I offer a historical
frame that points to race’s enduring and malleable condition. History is
not about the shadows of then, but the terra firma of now.
II. BEYOND BROWN: UNLOCKING THE DOOR
REPRESENTATIVE RACIAL PAST

TO A

MORE

Keyes v. School Board No. 1 was the first school desegregation Supreme Court case that did not involve a school district located in the
American South. There are two reasons why the case’s non-Southern orientation is significant. First, “unlike every school desegregation case heard
and decided by the Court since Brown, there was not the existence of a
state constitutional provision, executive enactment, legislative statute, explicit school board policy, or jurisprudence in the history of the state that
mandated the separation of the races in either segregated classrooms or
schools.”49 Rather, since Colorado achieved statehood in 1876, the state
49.

Romero, How I Rode the Bus, supra note 44, at 1024.
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constitution had specifically prohibited the use of race in the assignment of
students to its public schools.50
In spite of Colorado’s anti-discrimination constitutional provisions,
racism ran deep in the state. In the first decade of its founding in the
1860s, for instance, American Indians were massacred and displaced from
their native lands.51 During the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan had a major
influence in Colorado (particularly in Denver).’52 In the 1930s, explicit
anti-Mexican sentiment by the Governor and the state’s citizens resulted in
the National Guard being deployed against largely Mexican Americans and
documented Mexican migrants.53 And through much of the first seven
decades of the 20th century, practices by realtors, parents, school boards,
and politicians created widespread residential racial segregation, while actively working to prevent integration in and outside of schools.54
Coloradoans had long struggled to circumvent equality provisions and civil
rights protections under state law.55
Second, when eight Black, Latino, and White families filed suit
against the Denver public school board and its administration on June 19,
1969 for perpetuating an unconstitutional practice of segregation,56 “they
entered uncharted waters of the nation’s post-Brown school desegregation
50.
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (amended 1974) (“[N]or shall any distinction or classification of pupils be made on account of race or color . . . .”). Some of the debates regarding racial
classification of students in Colorado’s history can be found in Tom I. Romero, II, “Of Greater
Value than the Gold of Our Mountains”: The Right to Education in Colorado’s Nineteenth-Century
Constitution, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 781, 823–24, 832–33 (2012).
51.
See, e.g., RICHARD CLEMMER-SMITH ET AL., REPORT OF THE JOHN EVANS STUDY
COMMITTEE, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER 1-10 (2014); see also ARI KELMAN, A MISPLACED MASSACRE: STRUGGLING OVER THE MEMORY OF SAND CREEK (2013).
52.
During the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan had a major influence in Denver and Colorado.
See generally ROBERT ALAN GOLDBERG, HOODED EMPIRE: THE KU KLUX KLAN IN COLORADO 163-82 (1981); KENNETH T. JACKSON, THE KU KLUX KLAN IN THE CITY: 1915-1930, at
215-31 (1967); Gerald Lynn Marriner, Klan Politics in Colorado, 15 J.W. 76 (1976); James H.
Davis, Colorado Under the Klan, 42 COLO. MAG. 1965, at 93.
53.
Anti-immigrant sentiment in Denver and in Colorado was heavily directed towards
Mexican Americans. See generally Tom I. Romero, II, “A War to Keep Alien Labor out of Colorado”: The “Mexican Menace” and the Historical Origins of Local and State Anti-immigration Initiatives,
in STRANGE NEIGHBORS: THE ROLE OF STATES IN IMMIGRATION POLICY 64 (G. Jack Chin &
Carissa Hessick eds., 2014).
54.
Jones v. Newlon, 253 P. 386, 388 (Colo. 1927) (finding unconstitutional the segregation of extra-curricular social functions by the Denver School Board); Chandler v. Ziegler, 291
P. 822, 823 (Colo. 1930) (holding that a person owning real property may insert a racially
restrictive covenant to prevent sale of that same property interest to a person from a disfavored
race); see also Tom I. Romero, II, Our Selma Is Here: The Political and Legal Struggle for Educational
Equality in Denver, Colorado, and Multicolor Conundrums in American Jurisprudence, 3 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 73, 80–88 (2004).
55.
See, e.g., Jackson v. City and Cnty of Denver, 124 P.2d. 240, 241 (Colo. 1942) (upholding the constitutionality of a Colorado statute declaring void all marriages between Blacks
and Whites).
56.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 63 (D. Colo. 1970).

SPRING 2015]

The Keys to Reclaiming

427

jurisprudence. As a result, the Justices were confronted with the challenge
of determining how to measure racial segregation and inequity in a public
school system where the city’s largest and most impoverished group were
Mexican Americans.”57 According to Justice Brennan, this posed a challenge because, unlike cities in the American South, “Denver is a tri-ethnic, as distinguished from a bi-racial community.”58 Understanding how
discrimination worked in such an environment would require a varied and
sophisticated analysis of history, social context, and other factors not evident in the “bi-racial” cases.59 In a United States that was experiencing a
dramatic shift in immigration from Latin America and Asia, Keyes highlighted an emerging tri-ethnic, or more accurately, multi-color, order.60
The Supreme Court’s resolution of such issues promised to change
dramatically how the Court would understand and address racial discrimination. As Justice Powell summarized:
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to that in other
large cities across the country in which there is a substantial
minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There is segregation in the schools
of many of these cities fully as pervasive as that in southern
cities prior to the desegregation decrees of the past decade and a
half. The focus of the school desegregation problem has now
shifted from the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling
and foot-dragging as the process was in most places, substantial
progress toward achieving integration has been made in Southern States. No comparable progress has been made in many
nonsouthern cities with large minority populations primarily
because of the de facto/de jure distinction nurtured by the
courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices
which denounced the evils of segregated schools in the South.
But if our national concern is for those who attend such
schools, rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history

57.
Romero, How I Rode the Bus, supra note 44, at 1026. The only other case involving all
three groups that was filed during the same time period was Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 324 F. Supp. 599, 604 (S.D. Tex. 1970). That case, arising in Texas, involved a district that was largely “Mexican-American,” but also included “Anglos” and a small
number of “Negro” students. Cisneros. 324 F. Supp. at 608 n.37.
58.

Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 195 (1973).

59.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 195-198. The implications of Justice Brennan’s “tri-ethnic” observation in this case and others is found in Romero, ¿La Raza Latina?, supra note 6, at 263-302.
60.
See Rubén G. Rumbaut, Origins and Destinies: Immigration to the United States Since
World War II, 9 SOC. F. 583, 600–03 (1994). The distinction between, ethnic, race and color and
my decision to deploy the term multi-color is explored Romero, ¿La Raza Latina?, supra note 6,
at 249-255 (2007).
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rather than present reality, we must recognize that the evil of
operating separate schools is no less in Denver than in Atlanta.61
For this reason, Justice Powell saw the case as an opportunity to “formulate
constitutional principles of national rather than merely regional application.”62
Finding such constitutional principles, however, would be much easier in theory than in practice. For the first time since it had rendered its
decision in Brown, the Supreme Court could not find unanimous consensus in its school desegregation jurisprudence.63 Indeed, the splits on the
Keyes Court reflected the challenges subsequent courts would have in
grappling with how racial discrimination actually worked in non-Southern
contexts.64 For the reasons that will be described in the following sections,
the history that Keyes reflects tells us much more precisely than Brown
those “undeniable truths” about the nature, scope, and trajectory of race
and racism in the modern United States.
A. The New Metropolitan Geography and the Rise of
Post-Racial Colorblindness
By the time the Supreme Court rendered its Keyes decision in 1973,
the United States was in the midst of what urban historian Jon Teaford
describes as a “metropolitan revolution” in American Culture and life.65
Whereas in the years immediately before the Brown decision, the United
States was an “urban nation, dominated by clearly defined urban places
with an anatomy familiar and comprehensible,” by the 1970 and 1980s it
had become sprawling, decentered, and—spatially as well as culturally—
fragmented metropolitan regions.66
In the period from Brown in 1954 to Keyes in 1973, most of the
nation’s urban centers were losing population to suburbs and “independent” municipalities that initially formed a perimeter around center cities.67 Indeed, “[i]n 1970, for the first time in the history of the world, a
nation-state [the United States] counted more suburbanites than city
dwellers or farmers.”68 The suburbanization of the United States was not
just the logical extension of densely concentrated city-dwellers moving to
61.
61. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 218-19 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
62.
Id. at 219 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
63.
Romero, How I Rode the Bus, supra note 44, at 1028.
64.
See, e.g., Romero, ¿La Raza Latina?, supra note 6, at 269-302.
65.
See generally JON C. TEAFORD, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: THE RISE OF
POST-URBAN AMERICA passim (2006).
66.
Id. at 1; see also MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY (2007).
67.
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 284 (1985).
68.
Id. at 283-84.
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low-density suburban lots. Driving much of this change was the fact that
many Americans were moving from one region of the country to another,
as postwar economic growth spurred demand for capital and labor to
sprawling metropolitan areas in the Rocky Mountain West, Southeast, and
Pacific Coast.69 As one contemporary noted at the time,
“[A]pproximately seventy million people are not living in the houses
which they [had] occupied in 1940. Twelve million have changed their
state of residence; this is probably the largest population movement in history.”70 Such trends would continue until the end of the twentieth century,71 thereby creating unprecedented opportunities to live in the
exploding new metropolises of the post-World War II United States.
Of significance is what these new metropolises—especially the new
suburban developments in locales like Denver at the heart of the Keyes
case—would mean for race-relation issues. To be sure, such places seemed
a universe away from the “urban crises” tearing “rust belt” cities in the
Northeast and Midwest,72 and also different from the Southern cities and
towns with their massive resistance to the African American civil rights.73
One reason for this is that suburbs emerged from their inception as racially
homogenous and politically isolated communities.74 Almost exclusively
White and solidly middle-class, suburbs created what Matthew Lassiter
calls the “ascendance of color-blind ideology” that fuses “class-based individualism with color-blind innocence.”75 These suburban residents were
not strict segregationists like George Wallace or card-carrying members of
the Klu Klux Klan, but instead they fundamentally believed that their pursuit of the “American Dream” was “the product of meritocratic individualism rather than unconstitutional racism.”76
69.
For a broad historiographical examination of these trends as well as their influence on
social, political, and economic life, see generally Nickerson & Dochuck, supra note 40; David R.
Goldfield, The Rise of the Sunbelt: Urbanization and Industrialization, in A COMPANION TO THE
AMERICAN SOUTH 472, 472-93 (John B. Boles ed., 2002).
70.
Edwin A. Cottrell, Problems of Local Governmental Reorganization, 2 W. POL. Q. 599,
600 (1949).
DAVID K. IHRKE & CAROL S. FABER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMGEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 2005 TO 2010, 2 (2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/
2012pubs/p20-567.pdf.
71.

MERCE,

72.
The two classic statements of the urban crisis remain ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING
SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940–1960 (1998) and THOMAS J.
SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1996).
THE

73.

See, e.g., NUMAN BARLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS
SOUTH DURING THE 1950S (1999); GEORGE LEWIS: MASSIVE RESISTANCE: THE WHITE
RESPONSE TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2006).

IN THE

74.

See Romero, The Spatialization of (Color)Blindness, supra note 38, at 957-59.

75.
MATTHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS IN THE SUNSOUTH 4, 8 (2006).

BELT

76.

Id. at 1-2.
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Indeed, in conjunction with decisions such as Brown and Baker v.
Carr77 in 1962, grand legislative enactments such as the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968
reinforced the belief that subsequent racial and economic segregation in
American society was not the product of any overt state-sanctioned racial
project.78 Once formal barriers were removed, so the thinking went, all
Americans would be free to act in a color-blind way.79 As I have argued
elsewhere, “[p]ost-racialism and [the ideology of] color-blindness thus
became the same side of the same coin that would fund [a racially fragmented metropolitan landscape]. Consumption and meritocratic individualism, not race, would be the only organizing principle determining where
one lived, worked, played, raised families, and sent one’s children to
school.”80
As historians of the post-World War United States have documented,
one’s own decisions about where to live, build a home, raise a family, and
send one’s children to school were not made in isolation.81 Rather, these
cumulative decisions were intricately connected with federal, state, and
local housing, municipal and county government, land use laws, and policies that both exacerbated and furthered enduring patterns of racial residential segregation.82 Lassiter, in his history of the “silent [suburban]
majority” argues that these policies naturalized color-blindness because
they “did not require individual racism by suburban beneficiaries in order
to require White class privilege and maintain barriers of disadvantage fac77.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (enabling federal courts to intervene in state
redistricting schemes that diluted and minimized the impact of the African American voter).
This case allowed the Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) to establish the “one man
one vote” principle in how representation to state houses and legislatures would be apportioned.
78.
LASSITER, supra note 75, at 15-16. See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR
CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY passim (2002); NANCY MCLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE passim
(2008); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 passim (1980).
79.
See Mario L. Barnes, Racial Paradox in a Law and Society Odyssey, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV.
469, 480 (2010).
80.
Romero, How I Rode the Bus, supra note 44, at 1041. Post-racial refers to the “notion
that the United States has reached a point where race is so infrequently salient that it no longer
makes sense to organize around it or even acknowledge its presence.” Frank Rudy Cooper, PostRacialism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 114 (2012).
81.
See, e.g., LASSITER, supra note 75; SUGRUE, supra note 72; N.D.B. CONNOLLY, A
WORLD MORE CONCRETE: REAL ESTATE AND THE REMAKING OF JIM CROW SOUTH FLORIDA (2014); BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: HOW THE STRUGGLE OVER RACE AND
REAL ESTATE TRANSFORMED CHICAGO AND URBAN AMERICA (2009); DAVID M. P. FREUND,
COLORADO PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA
(2007); ROBERT O. SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POSTWAR
OAKLAND (2003); THE NEW SUBURBAN HISTORY (Thomas J. Sugrue, eds., 2006).
82.

Romero, The Spatialization of (Color)Blindness, supra note 38, at 968–83.
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ing urban minority communities.”83 The aggregate effect of such behavior
was to create a metropolitan landscape of profound racial design. One
contemporary astutely observed the insidiousness of postracialism: “New
municipal buildings, new roads and highways, urban renewal, and public
playgrounds and parks . . . seem[ ] to present means by which a segregation-minded community can improve [its] municipal facilities, while
achieving the intended elimination of Negroes in certain areas.”84 Part and
parcel of a larger system of White supremacy that shifted dramatically by
the 1960s, “the unexceptional” and “mundane” acts of local, state, and
federal governance—from paving streets to financing suburban tracts
homes—remade Jim Crow in innocuous and insidious ways.85
Keyes powerfully reflects these metropolitan trends and changes in
America’s racial history. One of the great assumptions of so-called Northern school desegregation suits was that the state or local governments in
those locales never engaged in formal projects of racial discrimination or
segregation. Especially in the urban and metropolitan West, cities such as
Denver were viewed as relative racial utopias.86 Nevertheless, the seemingly innocuous revision of attendance boundaries by the Denver school
board revealed only one of the many insidious ways that white supremacy
was maintained by local and state governments in these ostensibly postracial locales.87
83.

LASSITER, supra note 75, at 4.

84.
Joseph A. Milchen, Note, Unconstitutional Racial Classification and De Facto Segregation,
63 MICH. L. REV. 913, 922 (1964).
85.
CONNOLLY, supra note 81, 4-5; see also STEPHEN W. BENDER, TIERRA Y LIBERTAD:
LAND, LIBERTY, AND LATINO HOUSING 59–93 (2010) (exploring covert forms of land use planning and local government law to exclude Latina/os from neighborhoods and suburbs);
FREUND, supra note 81; COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL POLITICS
IN SUBURBAN AMERICA passim (2010) (examining national and local race-neutral policies that
cordoned off sprawling suburbs from central cities to create a form of color-blind racial apartheid
in the United States); Charles S. Aiken, Race as a Factor in Municipal Underbounding, 77 ANNALS
ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 564, 565 (1987) (documenting the resistance of White-dominated
suburban and exurban municipal governments to annex Black communities beyond the municipalities’ corporate boundaries).
86.
See, e.g., WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 48, at 260 (noting that Denver was
“a city of relative racial harmony”).
87.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 196-203 (1973); see also Daniel MartinezHoSang, Racial Liberalism and the Rise of the Sunbelt West: The Defeat of Fair Housing on the
1964 California Ballot, in Nickerson & Dochuk, supra note 40, at 188-213 (documenting resistance to fair housing and fair employment in California). Two powerful studies of local and
statewide resistance to racial equality in California are Mark Brilliant, The Color of America Has
Changed: How Racial Diversity Shaped Civil Rights Reform in California, 1941-1978 (2010)
and Shana Bernstein, Bridges of Reform: Interracial Civil Rights Activism in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (2010). The geographic impact of Western growth, illiberalism, and inequality
beyond metropolitan boundaries in the West is detailed in ANDREW NEEDHAM, POWER LINES:
PHOENIX AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN SOUTHWEST (2014).
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Brown and subsequent cases and legislative acts that struck down obvious and evident forms of racial discrimination was not the end of the
nation’s troubled history with race. Instead, it was the beginning of a massive restructuring of race relations and oppression that depended on a
color-blind metropolitan geography. Because metropolitan areas like the
one in Keyes were not seemingly burdened with the sins of the biracial
South, color-blindness made racial difference for the majority of those living in new, but nevertheless insulated, insular, and unconnected suburban
communities a relic of the past. This was a past, however, whose biracial
premises could neither contain nor account for the multicolor present that
were shaping metropolitan America.
B. Tri-Ethnic Transformation and the Old Juan Cuervo and New Jim Crow
in The Multicolor Metropolitan Landscape
When the Supreme Court observed in Keyes that Denver was triethnic, it recognized that the familiar Black-White binary for understanding the causes and thereby the consequence of race was inadequate for
understanding racial segregation in the Denver school district.88 More than
just a case about Denver, however, the Court’s observation reflected an
emerging multi-color reality that would directly challenge the color-blindness embedded in the metropolitan landscape. A key component of this
challenge was the Hart Cellar Immigration Act of 1965.89 Passed at precisely the same historical moment as the momentous civil rights legislation
dismantling Jim Crow, the Act dramatically changed patterns of migration
to the United States, and in so doing, cemented the “modif[ication of the
nation’s] racial map . . . that that been marked principally by the contours
of white and black and that had denoted race as a sectional problem.”90
According to the historian Mai Ngai, “[i]mmigration law was part of an
emergent race policy that was broader, more comprehensive and national
in scope.”91
For many historians, immigration law has long served to produce
racial categories with pernicious racial outcomes.92 Indeed, from the 1790
Naturalization Act requiring Whiteness as a prerequisite to citizenship93 to
the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act’s explicit racial quotas that excluded Chinese,
Japanese, and other Asians from immigrating,94 immigration law and pol88.
89.
90.

Id. at 195.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 79 STAT. 911 (1965).
MAI NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA 8, 227-264 (2004).
91.
Id. at 8.
92.
Id. at 8.
93.
See generally IAN F. HANEY-LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE 1-36 (1996).
94.
NGAI, supra note 90, at 7.
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icy has been one of the most powerful tools for creating racial inequity in
the United States, especially for Mexicans and Asians.95 While the impact
of immigration law and policy was largely regional prior to 1965, the Hart
Cellar Immigration Act fundamentally disrupted the demography of the
nation. Whereas prior to passage of the Hart Cellar Immigration Act of
1965, Latinos and Asians together constituted slightly less than 2% of the
U.S. population, by 2012 they collectively represented almost a quarter of
those counted by the census.96
Immigration law and policy had two important impacts on a multicolor geography that would emerge in Metropolitan America. First, beginning in the 1920s,
American cities witnessed a construction boom that surpassed
all previous decades of growth . . . . [S]everal million units of
housing were built during the decade [and also in the years
following World War II], allowing second generation immigrants to escape the slums. But while these were healthy
changes . . . [t]he expansion of the suburbs drew the rich and
middle-class out of the city. At the same time, the combination
of slowed immigration and economic mobility resulted in increased vacancy rates in working- class districts.97
African Americans and Latinos took up residence in those neighborhoods being abandoned by second generation Southern and Eastern European immigrants who saw themselves as White, “a development that
accelerated after World War II.”98
These patterns would remain largely unchanged into the last decades
of the 20th century. Yet, beginning around the 1990s, immigrant settlement to the nation’s metropolitan area’s began to bypass “the inner city

95.
(2010).

KELLY LYTLE HERNANDEZ, MIGRA: A HISTORY

OF THE

BORDER PATROL 10

96.
Seth Motel & Eileen Patten, Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States, 2011
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/02/15/statisticalportrait-of-hispanics-inthe-united-states-2011.
97.
Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses
of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 13-14 (2003).
98.
Romero, The Spatialization of (Color)Blindness, supra note 38, at 959-960; see KAREN
BRODKIN, HOW JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN
AMERICA (1998) (examining how Jews came to be viewed, by themselves and others, as White
in the decades following World War II); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS:
RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (rev. ed. 1999) (exploring how
European working class immigrants utilized the “wages” of labor power and hierarchy to become considered White); THOMAS A. GUGLIELMO, WHITE ON ARRIVAL: ITALIANS, RACE,
COLOR, AND POWER IN CHICAGO, 1890-1945 (2003) (detailing the many ways that Italians
benefited in countless ways from their privileged color status as Whites).
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and mov[e] directly to the suburbs.”99 As I have noted elsewhere, Latina/
os, Asians, Pacific Islanders, and African Americans, as well as African immigrants and their children “began to settle in large numbers in those same
suburban communities that had effectively excluded them during the second half of the twentieth century.”100 Finding older but affordable housing
stock in the suburbs built between the 1950s and 1980s,101 more communities of color have come to live in the suburbs than in core cities.102 Collectively, this has effectuated a profound transformation in how we
understand the racial demography of a nation where 85% of the nation’s
immigrants and 77% of the nation’s minority population live in metropolitan regions.103 The consequence is that “[t]he historically sharp racial and
ethnic divisions between cities and suburbs in Metropolitan America are
more blurred [now] than ever.”104
Nevertheless, increasingly multicolor suburbs are experiencing
profound racial tensions and dislocations in familiar ways. Nothing demonstrates this more than the recent history of Ferguson, Missouri, the St.
Louis suburb at the heart of the shooting death of the African American
man Michael Brown by a White police officer, Darrin Wilson.105 At one
time in the 1950s and 1960s, Ferguson represented an escape for many
Whites from the racial strife of inner-city St. Louis, where “[s]ingle family
home building and redlining by banks [allowed] blue-collar [W]hites
[to] live and work amongst each other.”106 As the population became
older and poorer over time, non-Whites, particularly young African
Americans moved into the suburbs. Whereas Ferguson was 85 percent
White in 1980, by 2014, Whites represented less than thirty percent of the
city.107 Although Blacks comprised a clear majority of the population,
99.
AUDREY SINGER, SUSAN W. HARDWICK, AND CAROLINE B. BRETTELL, TWENTYFIRST CENTURY GATEWAYS: IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA 14-15
(2008).
100.

Romero, How I Rode the Bus, supra note 44, at 1049.

WILLIAM H. FREY, METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INST., MELTING POT
CITIES AND SUBURBS: RACIAL AND ETHNIC CHANGE IN METRO AMERICA IN THE 2000S, at
10-11 (2011); see also MYRON ORFIELD & THOMAS LUCE, INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY,
UNIV. OF MINN. L. SCH. AMERICA’S RACIALLY DIVERSE SUBURBS: OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES 2 (2012).
101.

102.
See METRO. POLY PROG. BROOKINGS INST., METROPOLICY: SHAPING A NEW FEDPARTNERSHIP FOR A METROPOLITAN NATION 51, 60-62 (2008).

ERAL

103.

See id. at 4 (2008).

104.
FREY, supra note 101, at 13; see also Patience A. Crowder, (Sub)Urban Poverty and
Regional Interest Convergence, 98 MARQUETTE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
105.
What Happened in Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Nov. 25, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-po
lice-shooting.html?_r=0.
106.
Daniel J. McGraw, Ferguson: Race and the Inner-Ring Suburb, BELT MAGAZINE (Aug.
14, 2014), http://beltmag.com/ferguson-race-inner-ring-suburb/.
107.
Id.
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Ferguson’s city council, school boards, and police force remained overwhelmingly White.108
The changing racial and class demographics and disparate distribution of political power of inner-ring suburbs like Ferguson, moreover, created conditions little different to those in the inner-city: persistent patterns
of unequal growth, racial isolation, economic and educational discrimination, social as well as political inequality, and patterns of disparate and unequal policing.109 Indeed, over-policing of non-Whites represents the
racialized logic of a social, cultural, and legal system of the post-racial,
metropolitan landscape described in Part IIa. Most people are by now familiar with Michelle Alexander’s exploration of “mass incarceration in the
age of colorblindness,” a system where a “larger web of laws, rules, policies, customs and institutions” effectively stigmatize, control, and oppress
Blacks “labeled as criminals both in and out of prison.”110 The result of
this “tightly networked” system ensures the “subordinate status of a group
defined largely by race,” or the New Jim Crow.111 It is no surprise then
that the deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Garner,112 Tamir Rice,113 Trayvon
Martin,114 and other young men of color by police officers or others acting in positions of “authority” have so fully exposed the fallacies of colorblindness of the post-racial United States.115
108.
Id; see also Jordan Weissman, Ferguson is Mostly Black. Why is its Government So White?,
SLATE (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/08/14/ferguson_mis
souri_government_why_is_it_so_white.html.
109.
Accounts of this are documented extensively in BENDER, supra note 85, at 64-70
(examining various ways suburbs have excluded undocumented Latina/o immigrants); MYRON
ORFIELD, supra note 66, at 28-29, 49-64 (2002); ORFIELD & LUCE, supra note 101, at 25-34; and
Camille Z. Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 167,
175–76, 197 (2003) (“Patterns of suburban segregation mirror those of the larger metropolitan
area of which they are a part . . . .”). Moreover, this is not a new phenomenon, but occurred
roughly at the same time that “Jim Crow died and segregation remained” in the 1960s and
1970s. N.B.D. CONNOLLY, A WORLD MORE CONCRETE: REAL ESTATE AND THE MAKING OF
JIM CROW SOUTH FLORIDA 16 (2014) (exploring the practices and policies of real estate segregation in pre- and post-Jim Crow metropolitan South Florida).
110.
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2012).
111.
Id.
112.
Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue for
the Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2015, at A1; J. David Goodman & Al Baker, New York Officer
Facing No Charges in Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at A1.
113.
Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by Cleveland
Police, Then a Fatal One, NY. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2015, at A1; Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Boy Dies After
Police in Cleveland Shoot Him, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2014, at A12.
114.
The Events Leading to the Shooting of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES, June. 21, 2012, at
A1; see also Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet PostRacial Society, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1555 (2013).
115.
For example, in the wake of the events in Ferguson, the United States Department of
Justice detailed the disproportionate arrest and ticketing of Blacks in Ferguson as a way to balance
the city’s budget. CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE
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Moreover, over policing and mass incarceration has not tracked the
familiar Black-White binary of race relations. Latinos in general and Mexicans and Mexican Americans, in particular, have been “demonized as a
grave threat to the American culture, society, and the economy; . . . systematically excluded from rights privileges and protections extended to
other Americans; and . . . subject to increasingly harsh and repressive enforcement actions that drove them further underground.”116 In the last
decade alone, thousands of local municipalities and state governments have
taken immigration enforcement into their own hands by deputizing local
sheriffs to enforce federal immigration law, penalizing employers, landlords, and almost anyone who has business dealings with an immigrant.117
Such local and state authorities have also colluded with the federal government to create what legal scholar César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández
has dubbed the emblems of crimmigration law; whereby noncitizens and
citizens alike, especially those from Latin America, are conceptualized as
“criminal deviants and security risks,” and “people to be feared.”118
As with the “color-blind” criminal justice system documented in Alexander’s study, once a Latino is labelled “illegal,” the “old forms of discrimination—employment discrimination, housing discrimination, denial
of the right to vote, denial of educational opportunities, denial of food
stamps and other government benefits, and exclusion from jury service—
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 9-14 (2015). See also, Matt Apuzzo, Justice Report To Fault
Police in Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2015, at A1. Similarly, the Justice Department found the
Cleveland Police Department to have engaged in a pattern and practice of abuse towards the
African American community. Richard A. Oppel, Cleveland Police Citied for Abuse by Justice Department. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4 2014, at A1. Such actions have led the F.B.I. Director, in a February 2015 speech at Georgetown University, to acknowledge that “some officers scrutinize
African Americans more closely using a mental shortcut that ‘becomes almost irresistible and
maybe even rational by some lights’ because black men are arrested at much higher rates than
white men.” Michael S. Schmidt, F.B.I. Director Speaks Out on Race and Police Bias, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2015, at A1.
116.

DOUGLAS MASSEY, THE NEW LATINO UNDERCLASS 2 (2010).

117.
See, e.g., Tom I. Romero, II, No Brown Towns: Anti-Immigrant Ordinances and Equality
of Educational Opportunity of Latina/os, 12 J. OF GEN. RACE & JUST. 13, 17-34 (2008); Huyen
Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO L.J. 777, 785-796 (2008); Cristina M.
Rodrı́guez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008);
Rigel C. Oliveri, Between A Rock and A Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Immigrant Ordinances,
and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 56 (2009); collection of articles in CHIN AND
HESSICK, supra note 53.
118.
César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1457 (2014). As Garcı́a Hernández explains: “Convictions for a growing list of offenses results in
removal—the technical umbrella term for exclusion and deportation. Sometimes commission—
rather than conviction—of such an offense is sufficient. . . . At the same time, immigration law
enforcement has increasingly adopted the securitized approach of criminal law enforcement. And
criminal investigations involving certain crimes related to immigration activity have borrowed
many of the more lax procedures traditionally used in the civil immigration law system.” Id. at
1458.
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are suddenly legal.”119 It is no surprise that this occurs in metropolitan
areas where Joe Arpaio in suburban Maricopa County Arizona, Joe
Barletta, the Mayor of Hazelton Pennsylvania, and Steve Levy, the Suffolk
County Commissioner in Long Island New York became “overnight celebrities” for their virulent and oftentimes vicious crackdown on immigrant communities.120 To be sure, the spate of anti-immigration legislation
passed by local municipalities (especially those in the suburbs)121 and states
since 2005 has led many commentators to label such restrictions—and the
racial animus behind it—as Juan or José Crow.122 As I and others have
shown, this is not a new phenomenon, but one directly related to ways
that Latinos have been racialized since the early decades of the 20th century.123 In other words, the new Jim Crow is really the old Juan Crow for
Latinos who have long been affected by the racialized tensions inherent
when local and state governments exercise their most disciplinary powers
of sovereignty (policing) subject to the most minimal standards of judicial
review (immigration law).
Suburbs have thus become multi-color flash points. Blacks justifiably
rally against racial profiling and disparate targeting.124 Latinos navigate record numbers of deportations and overt questions about their citizenship,
work status, and right to live in the United States.125 Asian Pacific Islanders
119.

ALEXANDER, supra note 110, at 2.

120.
JUAN GONZALEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF LATINOS IN AMERICA (revised ed. 2011). I explore the phenomenon of these ordinances in relation to their historical
relationship to Latinos in Romero, No Brown Towns, supra note 117, at 17-34.
121.
Typical of such ordinances was one passed in the Dallas suburb of Famers Branch
where members of the city council stated that the goals of the enactments was to “sen[d] a
message to people who aren’t in the country legally, [that] Farmers Branch is not the place for
you.” Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 675 F.3d, 802, 805 n.4 (2012).
122.
See, e.g., Diane McWhorter, The Strange Career of Juan Crow, N.Y. Times (June 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/opinion/sunday/no-sweet-home-alabama.html.
123.
See Tom I. Romero, II Observations on History, Law, and the Rise of the New Jim Crow in
State-Level Immigration Law and Policy for Latinos, 66 AM. Q. 153 (March 2014). The historian
Kelly Lytle Hernández notes that “the increasing number of undocumented immigrants joining
African Americans in jails and prisons across the country . . . reveals how the paths of Mexican
Browns and black Americans cross.” KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRA! A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. BORDER PATROL 232-33 (2010). The very intersection of the Black and the Latino policing experience is explicitly made in Bill Conroy, Is This the Latino Ferguson?, THE DAILY BEAST
(Feb. 26 ,2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/26/is-this-the-latinoferguson.html.
124.
George Yancy & Judith Butler, What’s Wrong With ‘All Lives Matter’?, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 12, 2015), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/whats-wrong-with-alllives-matter/.
125.
Jens Manuel Krogstad, Americans Split on Deportations as Latinos Press Obama on Issue,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/11/
americans-split-on-deportations-as-latinos-press-obama-on-issue/ (noting record number of deportations and Latino organizations dubbing President Obama as the “Deporter in Chief”).
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are decried as being too academically successful,126 while many others ignore profound social differences in the community.127 Against this backdrop, many Whites dismiss altogether such concerns and decry nonWhites for “playing the race card.”128
Keyes anticipated a United States in which its racial landscape as well
as its geography was becoming more complicated and harder to define.
The Court made the prescient observation that complicated social and
demographic factors obscure patterns and practices of racial discrimination
“beyond the particular schools that are the subjects of those [equal protection] actions.”129 Indeed, in recognizing that the origins of discrimination
for Latinos were different from Black students in the case, it acknowledged
that its consequences were nevertheless the same.130 As a result, the Court
suggested a path to a more robust and sophisticated telling about the history of racial discrimination and its impact on a 21st century United States.
III.

CONCLUSION: WHAT’S PAST

IS

ALWAYS RACIAL PROLOGUE

Though Keyes failed to displace Brown as the desegregation case, the
case nevertheless provided a powerful alternative “blueprint” for lawyers
contesting discrimination in non-Southern contexts.131 For the reasons
described above, the case and the history it represents should similarly
126.
FRANK H. WU, YELLOW RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 39-78
(2002) (detailing the “model minority” myth and the race based tension stemming from Asian
American academic achievement).
127.
Jeff Guo, If Minneapolis is So Great, Why is it So Bad for African Americans?, WASH.
POST (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/17/ifminneapolis-is-so-great-why-is-it-so-bad-for-black-people/ (examining the disconnect between
increasing racial segregation and economic inequality in Minneapolis. Minnesota and its own
internal and national perception as a city of high employment, prosperity, and affordable
housing).
128.
. See generally GEORGE J SEFA DEI, ET AL., PLAYING THE RACE CARD: EXPOSING
WHITE POWER AND PRIVILEGE (2007). The logic of the “race card,” “color-blindness,” and
“post-racial” is perhaps summed up best by Touré, when he explains: “‘Post-racial’ is just one of
several terms that only pervert and distort the discussion of race and give people who wish to
disrupt the conversation a place to park their ideas. Others include ‘race card’ and ‘reverse racism’ and ‘race baiter.’ The naı̈ve term ‘race card’ always refers to a lack person racializing a
situation that the person using the term thinks doesn’t need to be racialized. It’s as if race was not
part of the situation, and no one was being black or white, and everybody was being color blind,
and whistling sweetly, until a black person came along and ruined everything by pointing out
race. But race is like weather—we only talk about it when it’s extreme but it’s always there.”
Touré, No such Place as ‘Post-Racial’ America, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2011), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/no-such-place-as-post-racial-america/?_r=1.
129.

Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973).

130.

Id. at 195-198.

131.
Roger I. Abrams, Not One Judge’s Opinion: Morgan v. Hennigan and the Boston Schools,
45 HARV. EDUC. REV. 5, 6–7 (1975); see also Romero, How I Rode the Bus, supra note 44, at
1050-1051.
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serve as a “blueprint” for today’s Court to consider how much has truly
changed in the United States.
Writing just a few years ago, the historian Gordon Wood wrote that
history imparts “powerful restraints on what we can think and do.”132 Not
surprisingly, the Court’s narrow vision of racial progress since Brown leaves
little room to imagine a world structured by deep, enduring, and protean
patterns of multi-color inequality. If law is to invoke history in order to
understand race relations today, its actors, Professor Wood tells us, have an
important responsibility because “a historical sense makes true freedom
and moral choice—and wisdom—possible.”133
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg’s dissent in the Shelby County case is
particularly instructive in highlighting the importance of a historical
sense.134 In her dissent, Justice Ginsberg made the following observation:
There is no question [ ] that the covered jurisdictions have a
unique history of problems with racial discrimination in voting.
Consideration of this long history, still in living memory, was
altogether appropriate. The Court criticizes Congress for failing to recognize that “history did not end in 1965.” But the
Court ignores that “what’s past is prologue.” And “[t]hose
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.135
As a consequence, Justice Ginsberg instead detailed a history that countered dramatically Chief Justice Roberts’s own historical narrative.
Whereas Ginsberg conceded that formal legal and political barriers that
mandated explicit racial discrimination had largely been eradicated in the
years surrounding passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, she nevertheless detailed other more covert racisms that created “second generation
barriers” for people of color in the exercise of their constitutional
rights.136 Although colorblind on their face, many of these barriers had the
practical effect of effectuating wide-spread and substantial racial discrimination no different in consequence from the same practices that prompted
the passage of the Voting Rights Act in the first place.137
Keyes and the history it reflects more accurately describes the “second generation barriers” perpetuating deep and persistent patterns of discrimination and inequality. The metropolitan, multi-color, and colorblind
132.
GORDON S. WOOD, THE PURPOSE
HISTORY 12 (2008).
133.
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Id. at 15.

134.
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.2612, 2642-2648 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
135.
Id. at 2642 (quoting W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 2, sc. 1 and G.
SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905)) ((internal references omitted)).
136.

Id. at 2636 (citing §§2(b)(2)-(3), 120 Stat. 577).

137.

Id. at 2642.
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history described in these pages, however, is one that the law has ignored
because it does not fit easily within its typical racial narrative designed to
show the nation’s ascendance from the cave of racial bigotry. Ironically,
the same markers used by the Roberts Court to describe this ascendance—
Brown, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act—obscures
how racism came to be re-configured and re-inscribed at the very same
time. Telling, re-telling, and the centering of histories like those in Keyes
seems like a necessary first-step to break the Roberts Court’s fixation on
its own racial shadows and in turn, emerge with “wisdom” out of a cave of
its own making.

